BAGHDAD -- Next week, Iraqi officials plan a welcome-back party for Big
Oil.
The government intends to auction off oil contracts to foreign companies for
the first time since Iraq nationalized its oil industry more than three decades
ago. If all goes according to plan in the first round, foreign oil companies
will move in to help Iraq revive production at six developed fields that have
suffered from years of war and neglect.
But Iraq's fractious politics have complicated the process. Some lawmakers
and oil officials have called for a delay of the auction. The man behind the
plan, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, appeared before parliament on
Tuesday, where some lawmakers questioned the legality of the proposed contracts
and what they called favorable terms for the foreign companies. But the auction
appears to have sufficient political support to go ahead on schedule, and Mr.
Shahristani and other government officials vowed to plow ahead.
Mr. Shahristani's oil deals are crucial to this war-torn country's economy.
Iraq is thought to have one of the world's largest supplies of crude oil, with
115 billion barrels in proven reserves. But foreign know-how is key to its plans
to boost oil output to four million barrels a day within four to five years,
from 2.4 million barrels currently.
Despite security risks, Western oil companies are clamoring to get in. Iraq
is still relatively unexplored, offering big companies a potentially easy-to-tap
source of growth. Some are touting Iraq as the most important opening of
petroleum fields since the discovery in 2000 of the giant Kashagan field in the
Caspian Sea.
Some 120 companies expressed interest in bidding for the contracts at the
June 29 and 30 auction, according to the oil ministry. Thirty-five companies
qualified to bid, including Exxon Mobil Corp., Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Italy's Eni SpA, Russia's Lukoil and China Petroleum & Chemical Corp., or Sinopec. The
six oil fields at stake are believed to hold reserves of more than 43 billion
barrels. Foreigners won't get the most prized piece of the action -- ownership
stakes in the reserves -- but will be paid fees for ramping up output.
Just over 20 of Iraq's roughly 80 known oil fields have been fully or
partially developed, and most of its production comes from just three giants,
North and South Rumaila and Kirkuk. Because lots of the black gold is considered
relatively easy to extract, oil experts estimate that exploration and
development in Iraq costs $1.50 to $2.25 a barrel, compared with about $5 in
Malaysia or $20 in Canada.
"We're talking about a huge volume of crude flowing through their system for
the companies who win the bids," says Samuel Ciszuk, IHS Global Insight's Middle
East Energy analyst. "On the other side, Iraq desperately needs technology, and
these companies can bring it."
But Mr. Shahristani, architect of the plan, is under attack from many
quarters. Falling oil prices have triggered a budget crisis, and he is being
blamed for not boosting production enough to make up the difference. Lawmakers
and some oil officials, meanwhile, say the auction will give foreigners too much
access to Iraq's resources. Mr. Shahristani also has been called to appear
before parliament for questioning about alleged corruption and mismanagement at
the ministry.
"He should not continue," says Jabber Khalifa al-Jabber, secretary of the
parliament's powerful Oil and Gas Committee. "Let someone who is qualified do
the job....I can't name one accomplishment."
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's spokesman, appearing earlier this month with
the oil minister, voiced confidence in him and reaffirmed that the auction would
take place as scheduled.
In a recent interview, Mr. Shahristani, 66 years old, says he has done
nothing wrong, and that lawmakers critical of him have a political agenda. He
says he looks forward to answering questions from parliament about corruption
and mismanagement.
"I'm not a political animal, and I don't enjoy politics," he says. "The only
reason I've accepted and continue with my responsibility is to protect the Iraqi
wealth from unclean hands."
Deals in Iraq often are reached over cups of tea late at night, but Mr.
Shahristani doesn't like schmoozing. In a capital built on patronage, he has
denied plum jobs to longtime friends. He's earned a reputation as a stickler for
rules, including cumbersome purchasing regulations that other oil officials
blame for slowing down Iraqi oil development. He has refused even small gifts,
such as neckties, from visiting oil executives, he says.
In his three years as oil minister, Mr. Shahristani has emerged as a key
lieutenant to Mr. Maliki. After violence started to ebb in Iraq in 2008, Messrs.
Maliki and Shahristani and a handful of other former Iraqi exiles have pushed an
ambitious set of economic reforms.
Western oil companies were kicked out of Iraq in 1972, part of a wave of
Mideast petroleum nationalization. Oil production hit at least three million
barrels a day before Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, then fell sharply to 300,000
barrels after economic sanctions and trade embargoes were imposed. Production
rebounded to about 2.5 million barrels before the U.S. invasion in 2003.
Iraqi lawmakers have squabbled for years over a draft petroleum law that
would set a legal framework for foreign companies to start drilling again. Tired
of waiting, Mr. Shahristani in 2008 unilaterally invited oil companies to bid on
contracts. Because global companies are reluctant to explore undeveloped fields
in Iraq without an oil law, Mr. Shahristani has focused on getting foreign help
pumping from existing fields. "We have done what we can with our national
resources, and now we need outside help," he says.
He says the contracts don't need approval from parliament, though he insisted
they fit the conditions outlined in the draft oil law, which is now being
redrafted in the cabinet. Some of the terms, he says, are particularly
beneficial to Iraq: Winners of the auction must fork over hundreds of millions
of dollars of cash in upfront loans to the government.
Mr. Shahristani, who grew up in Karbala in a prominent, religious family, is
a nuclear scientist by training. After studying in Moscow and spending time in
London, he earned masters and doctorate degrees in nuclear chemistry at the
University of Toronto. In 1978, he became chief adviser to the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission.
Saddam Hussein had consolidated power and become president. According to Mr.
Shahristani and others, he wanted a nuclear weapon. In a face-to-face meeting
with Mr. Hussein, Mr. Shahristani reminded him that Iraq had signed a
nonproliferation treaty and was bound by it. Mr. Hussein told him to concentrate
on science and leave politics to him, according to Mr. Shahristani and two other
scientists at the meeting.
A few days later, in December 1979, security officials took him to Iraq's
Internal Security facilities, where he was tortured for three weeks, he says.
Mr. Shahristani says his torturers offered him palaces and riches if he would
reconsider his refusal to work on nuclear weapons. He declined and was put into
solitary confinement, where he remained for 10 years, he says. "But I never lost
my will, I never lost my faith," he says.
In 1990, he was released from solitary confinement. A year later, the U.S.
bombardment of Baghdad during the first Gulf War sowed chaos at the prison.
Another inmate stole some intelligence-corps uniforms and arranged for a getaway
car.
One evening, Mr. Shahristani and two others managed to evade guards, duck
into a storage room and put on the stolen uniforms. After hiding for several
hours, they snuck past some visiting intelligence officers playing cards and
hustled out the prison gate.
They met up with their families and snuck across the border into Iran. For
the next few years, Mr. Shahristani helped Iraqi dissidents and refugees. In
1995, he and his wife, a Canadian, set up the Iraqi Refugee Aid Council. He
became an outspoken critic of Mr. Hussein's regime and of nuclear
proliferation.
After U.S. troops poured into Baghdad in April 2003, he returned. He was
identified by American officials as a top contender for the prime minister's
job. He declined the position because it wasn't an elected one, he says, instead
becoming deputy speaker of Iraq's parliament.
Around that time, Mohammed Baqir, a family friend who had helped Mr.
Shahristani escape from prison, asked for his help in finding government jobs
for relatives. Mr. Shahristani refused. "Shahristani's problem is he is too
straight and clean," Mr. Baqir says. "As a politician, you need to be
flexible."
After a new government led by Mr. Maliki was formed in 2006, the prime
minister named him oil minister. His new ministry, like other government
agencies at the time, was overrun by militia members, and corruption was
rampant, according to Mr. Shahristani and other current and former oil
officials.
Over the next two years, hundreds of ministry employees were murdered or
kidnapped. By the end of 2007, many top technocrats had fled the country, and
various political parties had filled the ministry with patronage employees,
according to Mr. Shahristani and the other officials.
Mr. Shahristani fired 250 members of the ministry's security staff thought to
be militia members, and replaced top security officials with people he trusted.
He turned over evidence of wrongdoing to the ministry's inspector general, and
fired or transferred those suspected of malfeasance.
"Before, there was lots of interference in the ministry from political blocs,
but he got rid of all that," says Abdul Mahdy al-Ameedi, head of the ministry's
contracts department.
The purge stirred resentment. Some employees claimed they were wrongly
targeted. Others accused Mr. Shahristani of being too by-the-book. He cracked
down on absenteeism and introduced a card-scan check-in system. He scaled back
bonuses.
But boosting oil production significantly proved difficult. Insurgents were
attacking pipelines and refineries. Without a legal framework in place, foreign
companies were reluctant to come to Iraq. The oil law stalled in parliament.
An impatient government in the semiautonomous Kurdish north decided to move
without Baghdad. In September 2007, Kurdish officials signed a deal with
Texas-based Hunt Oil Co.
Mr. Shahristani criticized the deal, saying it had no legal standing. The
Kurdish government accused him of moving too slowly, and pressed ahead with its
deal.
A Western official in Baghdad who has dealt with Mr. Shahristani says he and
others advising the government agreed that Mr. Shahristani was moving too
slowly. Oil prices were sky-high, and foreign oil executives were eager to get
into Iraq. The country needed a "wheeler-dealer type," this official says.
Recently, he dropped his longtime opposition and allowed the Kurdish
government to begin exporting oil. He yielded after the Kurds agreed to have
Baghdad's central government receive payments for the exports.
In this month's auction, Western firms also are competing to develop two
natural-gas fields. All these deals are so-called technical-service contracts.
Essentially, Iraq will pay companies a fee for boosting output. The contracts
will last 20 years. Oil executives would prefer "production sharing" agreements,
which give companies a share of profits, and typically allow them to book new
reserves. They are nonetheless eager to get their feet in the door. Mr.
Shahristani says companies that offer the lowest costs and most profit for Iraq
will win. If the auction succeeds, the winners are expected to begin work in
November.
The Oil Ministry is planning a second round of bidding, to cover oil fields
that have been explored but not fully developed. Nine of the 38 companies that
applied to participate have been chosen as bidders. Those contracts will be
awarded at the end of this year.
Mr. Shahristani's term ends when a new government is formed after elections
early next year. He plans to return to the Iraqi National Academy of Science,
which he established in 2003. "I am not a politician," he says.
—Munaf Mustafa and Jabbar al-Obedi in Baghdad contributed
to this article.
Write to Gina Chon at gina.chon@wsj.com
Big Oil Ready for Big Gamble in Iraq - Source